

How you can help

You can assist the New Zealand Government's counter-proliferation efforts by advising the NZSIS of any unusual attempts to acquire sensitive goods and technology, or any suspicious attempts to gain knowledge or expertise that has WMD applications. This will help protect your commercial or institutional integrity as well as New Zealand's international reputation.

EXPORTERS

Suspicious approaches or orders relating to proliferation activity may include:

- an unconvincing explanation for why the items are required, in view of the customer's normal business or the technical sophistication of the items
- routine installation, training or maintenance services are declined
- payment by cash or offers above the ticket price
- the customer is new and you cannot substantiate the nature of their business
- excessive requirements for confidentiality about final destinations, or customers, or specifications for items
- the customer or end-user is a foreign military or government research body
- a sale being cancelled but a short time later an identical order is received under a different name
- the customer uses a generic email address rather than one related to the purported business

Be aware that front companies or other intermediaries may disguise the true end-user.

RESEARCHERS AND EDUCATORS

Suspicious attempts to gain knowledge or expertise of potential WMD application may include:

- enquiries about enrolling students for, or seeking employment on, WMD-relevant research projects
- applications for work or training in industry areas with potential WMD applications
- requests to attend conferences and seminars on sensitive topics
- requests from unknown individuals, institutions and companies for help and advice in a specific area of technology and/or technical process
- requests relating to matters on which scientists, experts, research institutes and laboratory staff etc would not normally seek advice or information and for which unconvincing reasons or evasive explanations are given

For more information on treaties, export control regimes and examples of suspicious approaches, go to www.nzsis.govt.nz

WE VALUE YOUR JUDGEMENT AS AN EXPERT



**New Zealand
Security Intelligence Service**
Te Pa Whakamarumarū

A guide to Weapons of Mass Destruction

Your role in preventing
proliferation of
weapons of mass
destruction

WHERE TO GO FOR ASSISTANCE

If you want advice or wish to report suspicious activities, please contact:

New Zealand Security Intelligence Service

Free Phone: **0800 SIS 224** (0800 747 224)

Telephone: 64 4 472 6170

Facsimile: 64 4 472 8209

Email: proliferationconcerns@nzsis.govt.nz

Website:

<http://www.nzsis.govt.nz>

Postal Address:

PO Box 900

Wellington

For all enquiries relating to exports and the NZSGL, please contact:

Export Controls Team

International Security & Disarmament Division

Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade

Telephone: 64 4 439 8227

Facsimile: 64 4 439 8519

Email: exportcontrols@mfat.govt.nz

Website:

<http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/Export-controls>

Postal Address:

Private Bag 18901

Wellington



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Weapons of Mass Destruction and Proliferation

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are devices – including nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons – that can cause large scale harm to people and/or property. Proliferation is the spread or inadvertent supply of goods, technology or knowledge to entities seeking to develop WMDs and their delivery systems.

A wide range of seemingly benign industrial goods, technology and expertise can assist WMD programmes and would-be proliferators, who can be state or non-state entities, and those who assist them for profit or ideology.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses a significant threat to regional and global security.

New Zealand Engagement

Countries with WMD ambitions may use seemingly legitimate trade and scientific exchanges to acquire parts, goods and technology with WMD applications. The New Zealand Government strongly supports international efforts to prevent WMD proliferation by actively participating in international arms treaties and maintaining export control regimes. International trade is encouraged, while maintaining New Zealand's international non-proliferation obligations by monitoring the export of goods, knowledge and technologies.

The New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) investigates and seeks to disrupt proliferation-related activity and offers advice to the commercial, academic and scientific communities. We work with other government agencies to deter activities that may contribute, wittingly or unwittingly, to WMD proliferation.

Exports and Exporters

As an expert in your field, you may recognise if there is a potential WMD application for your export or technology. The NZ Strategic Goods List (NZSGL) administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) is a list of export-controlled military and dual-use goods based on international regimes. A permit can sometimes be required for electronic export, such as by email or fax.

Dual-use goods

Dual-use goods can be defined as commercial items with a legitimate civil application that can also be adapted for use in a military or WMD programme.

Dual-use goods include items, technology and expertise, and plans or designs related to the following NZSGL categories:

- Materials, Chemicals, Micro-organisms and Toxins
- Aerospace and Propulsion
- Navigation and Avionics
- Materials Processing
- Telecommunications and Information Security
- Electronics
- Computers
- Marine
- Nuclear Materials
- Sensors and Lasers

Export of items not listed on the NZSGL may still be controlled by an end-use "catch-all" provision. This extends controls to cover the export of unlisted goods and technologies, that have a WMD or military application, to a country subject to United Nations Security Council arms embargoes. MFAT's Export Controls Team can advise whether a permit to export is required.

Example – Export of Sensitive Dual-use Equipment

A New Zealand electronics manufacturer receives an overseas order for radio equipment with encryption capabilities. Depending on the specifications of the equipment's encryption, it may be subject to NZSGL control. For clear direction as to export permit requirements for this equipment the supplier should seek advice from MFAT.

Knowledge and Expertise

Knowledge and expertise are as valuable as physical goods and technology to those intent on developing a WMD capability. New Zealand's commercial, academic, scientific, and research communities could inadvertently provide opportunities to acquire knowledge for use in WMD programmes.

The acquisition and export of knowledge, known as "Intangible Technology Transfer" (ITT), can occur in different ways including:

- knowledge gained from a course of study at a tertiary institution
- involvement in a commercially-sponsored research and development project
- information shared at conferences
- information shared via email or online forums

An individual's potential ITT risk is assessed on a number of factors, such as:

- area of study/research/specialisation
- advanced level of study or research e.g. PhD or Masters
- previous or current employment/research/publication background
- connections with entities of known proliferation concern

Example – Research

A New Zealand researcher whose area of expertise has potential WMD applications attends an international conference. Shortly after, the researcher receives an email invitation to participate in an online scientific forum from an overseas-based scientist.

The New Zealander's expertise is at risk from exploitation for WMD purposes under the guise of scientific exchange. The information exchanged over the internet may make it subject to NZSGL export control.

