Opening
Good morning. I have now had the great privilege of leading the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service for almost five years and am delighted to have been reappointed for a further three years from May.
This morning I will briefly outline the key threats I believe New Zealand is facing and what we are doing about them.
Terrorism and Violent Extremism
Turning first to New Zealand’s terrorism threatscape.
Currently, the national terrorism threat level is set at ‘low’, which means an attack is assessed as possible but not expected. ‘Low’ does not mean no threat. The threat level is continually under review and can change, and we need to be prepared for that.
At any one time, around 30 people are of particular interest to the NZSIS. This number is not static. As investigations into individuals of interest are resolved or their activities of concern diminish, other individuals of interest emerge. The overall number accordingly fluctuates over time, but during the reporting period the number of people of more serious concern remained steady.
Despite ISIL losing most of its physical territory, the influence of terrorism and radical ideologies remains persistent in the online sphere where it is easily accessible to anyone. Over time, this can lead to self-radicalisation and may also lead individuals to mobilise and undertake activity in support of an extremist ideology. A small but concerning number of New Zealanders continue to engage with this often violent online content and radical ideology which presents a risk to others.
As I have said previously, there is a small number of New Zealand citizens – men and women, some of whom are dual citizens – who are likely in the conflict zone in Syria. As you can imagine, it is very difficult to obtain accurate information about the fate of those individuals because the situation is very fluid. We are working with international partners to obtain intelligence about any New Zealand person who may be involved in the conflict. In the event of a return of a foreign terrorist fighter or somebody who has travelled to the conflict zone to join ISIL, we would work closely with New Zealand Police and other agencies. That contingency planning has been in train for some time.
Within the wider geographic region, extremist groups remain influential in Southeast Asia. There is an ongoing threat to travellers and Western interests in the region.
Over the past three years, many Southeast Asian countries have experienced a second wave of extremist attacks.
Just last month (January 2019) ISIL claimed responsibility for the bombing of a church in Jolo, Philippines. The attack killed at least 20 people and injured over 100 others.
Internationally, Al-Qaida retains influence and capability, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, but with links elsewhere. Their capability has been degraded but not destroyed.
Internationally the slow, but concerning rise of right wing extremism also continues.
Review of New Zealand’s Counter-Terrorism legislation
As has been stated publicly, the Government is seeking to review New Zealand’s counter-terrorism legislative settings.
As you know New Zealand's counter-terrorism legislative regime spans several statutes. It has evolved over time, often in response to significant events like 9/11.
NZSIS does not lead policy work on legislation, but we are actively working with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Ministry of Justice and Police to analyse the counter-terrorism legislation regime to ensure that it is fit for purpose.
As this work is still underway I am unable to comment further at this stage. Outcomes will be reported to Ministers in due course.
Espionage and Foreign Interference
New Zealand, like many other countries in the world, is the target of foreign interference and espionage, and countering these national security threats is a high priority for NZSIS.
NZSIS uses the term foreign interference only to describe an act by a foreign state that is intended to influence, disrupt or subvert a New Zealand national interest by covert, deceptive or threatening means.
Foreign interference, as defined, does not include normal diplomatic activities or efforts to increase influence or shape perceptions or policy by open lobbying or persuasion. Nor does it include the political activities of New Zealanders acting freely and expressing their views in accordance with their own beliefs.
The reality is that foreign intelligence services have the intent and capability to target our nation’s interests both in New Zealand and offshore.
We have seen attempts, from a range of state actors to:
- seek out New Zealand information, intellectual property and technology;
- covertly gain influence with a range of decision makers; and
- pressure individuals and communities to subscribe to particular views or actions.
NZSIS is concerned with covert attempts to influence, where the foreign state actor seeks to obscure its involvement. Likewise, NZSIS is concerned with foreign interference which seeks to prevent, disrupt or undermine the normal functioning or authority of New Zealand’s Government or the ability of New Zealanders to exercise their lawful rights. Not all of this activity is illegal, but it is all of security concern.
As was the case with my predecessors, I have a longstanding practice of not commenting on specific cases, including those relating to foreign interference. This practice protects NZSIS’s capabilities, methods and sources. I am therefore unable to provide further comments on foreign interference in this unclassified session. I can provide further information on this general area of work in the classified session.
The Committee may be aware that the Director-General of the GCSB and I will soon be appearing before the Justice Committee to assist its inquiry into the 2017 General Election and 2016 local elections.
As the Justice Committee session will be closed I would like to take the opportunity to speak briefly to this issue now.
States may be motivated for a range of tactical and strategic reasons to attempt political interference against New Zealand, and this could take the form of interference in our elections and our democratic institutions.
When NZSIS and GCSB carry out our functions, our legislation requires that we act in accordance with New Zealand law and human rights obligations. We must be independent, professional, and act at all times with integrity. We must be politically neutral, and must not take any action in respect of any person solely because they are exercising their right to freedom of expression. We must also act in a way that facilitates effective democratic oversight.
So we are very mindful of the need to ensure that efforts to prevent foreign interference in New Zealand do not hinder democratically protected rights to political expression.
Before the 2017 General Election, NZSIS and GCSB worked with DPMC, the Ministry of Justice, the Crown Law Office, and other agencies to develop a protocol which would have been triggered if we had observed signs of possible foreign interference in the election. It has already been publicly reported that the Protocol was not activated.
The fact that the protocol was not used in 2017 does not mean that there are no threats to New Zealand’s democratic processes and institutions. Our open democracy, the right to freedom of expression and our free press are fundamental to who we are as a country. As other liberal democracies have found, our very openness creates some vulnerabilities to foreign interference. We all need to be aware of that, to be vigilant, and to safeguard our democratic values and the institutions that underpin them. This remains a key area of focus for NZSIS.
Protective security functions
In addition to our intelligence functions, NZSIS also has protective security functions for which it is responsible.
Ensuring we have strong protective security settings across our public and private sector is a way we can help protect New Zealand from some of the key methods deployed by state actors.
Protective security functions: Protective Security Requirements
Our work with public sector agencies helps to ensure they are employing best practice when it comes to protecting their people, information, and assets.
Our Protective Security Requirements team has a strong customer focus. The team provides information, tools, and guidance to ensure that its customers have protective security measures in place to help mitigate security risks.
The Protective Security Requirements framework is a fantastic resource, which is available to the public and private sectors. Our engagement team also provides support and advice to public service departments and a range of other customers, including some private sector companies and academic institutions, which are increasingly interested in how to improve their security posture.
We have significant expertise in this area, and we take very seriously our responsibility to educate others on how to stay safe and secure.
NZSIS’s work in this space is likely to increase in the year ahead, because the protective security leadership role of Director-General of Security has been formalised as a functional leadership role for the public service – working closely with the Director-General of GCSB, who provides functional leadership on issues of IT and cyber-security.
Protective security functions: Security Clearance Vetting
Vetting is another important measure to ensure classified information is handled by the right people.
I am particularly proud of the significant progress made in the system to assess people for security clearances.
Historically, the inability to process the total number of security clearance applications received each year has resulted in a very significant backlog.
During the performance year, the average time taken to process a security clearance application was reduced by 51 per cent, from 157 working days to 77. We have already cleared the backlog in relation to Top Secret Special clearance applications, and I am advised that we are on track to clear the backlog on both Top Secret and Confidential vettings by 30 June this year, leaving only Secret clearances as our final level to resolve. Once the backlog is removed, the process becomes sustainable and my expectation is that we will be able to meet our ambitious KPIs.
These improvements are the result of internal efficiencies and uplift in staff capability as a result of training and development.
These improvements have been made while also seeking to enhance the overall customer experience. We have done this through making more information available about the vetting process and engaging more actively with vetting candidates and employing agencies.
Closing
In closing, I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge and thank the staff who choose to work for the NZSIS.
The reality of their roles means, for many of them, very few people know what they do and they will never receive recognition for the contribution they make.
I am extremely proud of their unwavering commitment to protecting the security of our country, and the safety of their fellow New Zealanders.
Through their hard work and dedication the Service has positively contributed to the ongoing security and wellbeing of New Zealand and New Zealanders.
Thank you. I welcome any questions from the Committee.