New Zealand's Security Threat Environment 2026

New Zealand’s public and private sectors are being targeted by foreign states and their proxies to gain access to critical assets including intellectual property, innovative technology and other non-public information.

The activity NZSIS sees cannot be described as benign. It involves state actors with a voracious appetite for any information they can leverage to gain an advantage over New Zealand or our partners.

Espionage, or spying, is covertly accessing protected information. Foreign states frequently use proxies to do this, and recruit individuals who can provide insight into New Zealand’s information and systems. Espionage techniques can also be used to support foreign interference activity.

We see the potential for real harm. The material sought could hand a foreign state access to valuable information relating to New Zealand’s policies, decision-making, industry and international relations. Successfully accessing protected information provides foreign states with a strategic advantage against New Zealand and undermines both our national security and future prosperity.

New Zealand is of interest to foreign states seeking to advance their economic interests, military capabilities, technologies and foreign affairs objectives.

Some attempts at espionage will be made through legitimate channels such as open academic exchanges and commercial relationships, while others will use cyber infiltration, fake cover companies or straight-out theft. All will try to obscure any link back to the foreign state.

If the state is highly motivated to obtain a specific set of information, or achieve a specific outcome, they will often use any means at their disposal.

We expect espionage activity to increase in frequency over the next 12 months. Some attempts to gain information and access will likely be successful, but there are a range of simple, cost-effective measures that can make New Zealand a harder target. Please read the protective security information associated with this chapter.

There are several states that conduct espionage against New Zealand, but the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the only country we have detected doing it at scale.

The PRC’s intelligence services may be the most active at espionage, but that should not prevent New Zealand organisations from engaging or doing business with entities in that country.

New Zealand businesses should take an eyes wide open approach to espionage across all international markets where they operate. Risks can be managed in a way that ensures future prosperity and preserves New Zealand’s national interest.

Did you know?

The PRC’s national security laws compel any individual or organisation in China to comply with requests from its intelligence services. This could involve handing over data or intellectual property and providing access to systems.

Foreign states continue to target the New Zealand Government and its officials for non-public information.

Protected information is particularly sought after to help states identify vulnerabilities that would provide it with an advantage over New Zealand and its international partners. However, the scope is much larger than just talking classified information. Sensitive data on New Zealanders and policy insights that may seem uninteresting could still be of value to a foreign state.

Information collected can also be used to support foreign interference activity or other covert operations conducted by the state.

State-sponsored cyber-attacks are an increasingly common means of accessing networks that hold important non-public information. Following a decline in 2022, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and its partners have detected a steady increase in espionage-motivated cyber activity against New Zealand over the last three years. The New Zealand Government has also spoken about specific incidents.

Another common tactic currently being used involves recruiting people with government connections or insider knowledge and pressuring them to provide insights.

Given the broad nature of the information being targeted, organisations will also need to take a broad approach to protect sensitive data.

New Zealand’s universities and research institutions will need to stay alert to attempts by foreign states to secure technology which can be repurposed for military development.

The open and collaborative nature of New Zealand academics, and the cutting edge technology being created within our universities may be exploited under the banner of cooperation or partnership.

Collaboration and innovation drive academic progress and bring financial benefits, but when dual-use technologies are involved, the level of risk is elevated.

Dual-use technologies have both civilian and military functions, but the distinction has become increasingly blurred with modern warfare now weaponising commercial tools such as AI and off-the-shelf drones.

Academic exchanges and talent recruitment programmes are commonplace and are valuable opportunities for New Zealand universities and students. While the vast majority of students coming to study in New Zealand will have genuine intentions, these programmes are used by some states to covertly and illicitly access intellectual property and technology. They also use them as a way to disguise military or intelligence agencies’ involvement.

These programmes and associated scholarships provide a powerful financial lever, which can be used by states to compel academics to undertake activities on behalf of the state, irrespective of how these activities could impact New Zealand and our interests.

New Zealand students on overseas exchanges would be surprised if asked to conduct espionage, but authoritarian countries operate with a different playbook.

Academic researchers are not the only target. Over the last year, some foreign states have attempted to target New Zealand’s businesses and non-government organisations to covertly gain access to intellectual property, innovative technology, and other resources.

Espionage has an economic cost. Losing control of crucial intellectual property can prevent commercialisation of an innovation or an idea. States targeting private businesses are usually looking to access technology that could accelerate their industrial or military capabilities at New Zealand’s expense.

Over the past year, we have seen foreign states attempt to deceptively obtain sensitive technology while covering up the paper trail.

Some states will attempt to acquire sensitive technology through international front companies and supply chain intermediaries by presenting a plausible cover story designed to allay any security concerns. Brokers and resellers may also be used to conceal an end-user’s identity.

Intermediaries may try to approach an organisation’s leadership with an investment opportunity or aim to recruit employees to facilitate a transfer of technology or knowledge.

Foreign states hope to fly under the radar as a regular commercial operator. They assume companies will only do surface-level due diligence on the intermediary’s business and not question why they are seeking the technology. False declarations will also be made. Once the goods are acquired, they might be routed through a number of overseas jurisdictions and trade hubs to further disguise the final customers which often include states such as Russia and Iran.

As explained earlier, foreign states may try to steal the technology in multiple ways. For example, while trying to access technology through a front company, they may also be trying to breach the organisation’s cyber defences at the same time.

It pays to strategise ways vulnerabilities may be exploited and understand the various ways commercially sensitive intellectual property might be used. By protecting New Zealand’s technology, we also protect our economy and ensure New Zealand preserves its reputation as a safe and secure place to innovate.

Case study

Front companies can be used as a way to circumvent international sanctions and export controls. A Russian state-owned organisation sought to acquire specialised components from the offshore subsidiary of a New Zealand registered company. The technology could have been used to enhance Russia’s military capability. The link to Russia’s government was concealed during the approach as international sanctions and export controls meant there was no way for the organisation to legitimately access these components. Once the New Zealand company was informed of these links, they made sure additional due diligence documentation about end users was sought by their subsidiary.

New Zealand has a flourishing space sector, but over the past 12 months New Zealand’s intelligence agencies have identified foreign state actors seeking to exploit the industry’s reputation for cooperation and partnership.

Our strategic location makes New Zealand an ideal place to install Ground Based Space Infrastructure (GBSI). The equipment is designed to track satellites and space debris, as well as for collecting a range of other scientific data. GBSI is also attractive for foreign states seeking to advance military capabilities and intelligence operations.

New Zealand and Pacific Island countries are well placed to track satellites passing over the Asia-Pacific in a variety of orbits, with minimal radio frequency interference and visual impediments. New Zealand can be the first or last opportunity to observe and communicate with satellites transiting regions with low GBSI coverage.

While investment in New Zealand’s space industry is welcomed, some state actors and co-opted entities seek to deceptively install GBSI to advance their country’s capabilities without authorisation or transparency about how it will be used, and for whose advantage.

Legitimate GBSI operators in New Zealand have been led to believe they are entering a commercial or research partnership with a foreign entity, but the company’s links back to a foreign state have been deliberately obscured.

A foreign state illicitly exploiting our space industry in this way undermines New Zealand’s sovereignty, and the information gathered has the potential to be used against our interests, such as covertly informing another country’s military activity.

Case study

Purple Mountain Observatory, an organisation based in the People’s Republic of China with close links to its government was found in the past year attempting to install Ground Based Space Infrastructure in New Zealand.

They worked with a local company that was likely unaware of the equipment’s capability to collect intelligence of military value and would have no idea who was receiving the data.

Purple Mountain’s close links to the PRC Government means they could be compelled to pass on any data collected, however, in this case we assess it would have been willingly passed on.

NZSIS, working with other agencies was able to disrupt this activity, but it was not the first time this organisation has attempted to install its own GBSI in New Zealand and is unlikely to be the last.

Legitimate GBSI operators in New Zealand and those in the Pacific are encouraged to sharpen their due diligence practices as future attempts will likely use more obfuscation.

Did you know?

GBSI operators are now regulated under the Outer Space and High Altitude Activities Act to protect New Zealand’s national security, foreign relations and national interests. Operators must obtain authorisation to carry out regulated activities and are required to include annual reporting verifying that protective security and due diligence arrangements remain up to date.

NZSIS is increasingly coming across espionage activities that while affecting New Zealand are primarily directed towards the broader Pacific region.

Intelligence officers and co-optees are also active in the Pacific seeking to gain insights and information which is used to undermine Pacific regionalism, sovereignty and the national interests of a range of countries. When NZSIS identifies links to the Pacific while investigating threats to our national security, we share intelligence with Pacific partners and work with them to help support the Pacific country’s decision making.

Case study

Through domestic security intelligence investigations, NZSIS has identified individuals carrying out espionage and foreign interference activities in the Pacific on behalf of a foreign intelligence service. These activities seek to advance the foreign state’s policy objectives through deceptive and corruptive means. These actions undermine the security and sovereignty of New Zealand and Pacific countries. NZSIS shares this intelligence with relevant Pacific partners along with protective security advice on how risks can be managed.

We have observed increased targeting of professional networking sites and online job platforms for espionage purposes by China’s military intelligence services.

Specifically targeted are current and former New Zealand Government officials who have had access to classified or sensitive information. Five Eyes partners have had similar experiences.

PRC intelligence officers, or their affiliates, use an aggressive strategy where they pose as consultants or employees of think tanks, or recruitment firms. They place online job advertisements looking for analysts in foreign policy, international relations, defence or security.

Candidates are then vetted by PRC intelligence to determine what information they have had access to and whether they would divulge it. Sometimes the assessment will involve paying a candidate to produce research papers on specific topics to understand the depth of their knowledge.

Successful candidates are pressured to provide privileged non-public information for unspecified clients who have obscured their links back to the PRC government.

The job offers are lucrative, but the intelligence officers often encourage their candidates to keep their government jobs both to keep the information tap running and to open up opportunities to recruit their colleagues.

These offers are about much more than earning some extra cash on the side. PRC’s intelligence services are ultimately after privileged military, political and economic intelligence to support their state objectives.