New Zealand's Security Threat Environment 2025

States conduct foreign interference in New Zealand in order to achieve their strategic goals.

A range of people will be used by foreign states, either directly or implicitly, to conduct activity which aims to manipulate New Zealand’s government and society to become more amenable to the foreign state’s interests.

There are several states undertaking foreign interference in New Zealand. The most active remains the People’s Republic of China (PRC), though it is not the only foreign state carrying out activity of concern.

The NZSIS sees two main types of foreign interference in New Zealand - political and societal. Political interference refers to acts by foreign states that are intended to influence, disrupt, or subvert New Zealand’s governance, policy making, or political systems by deceptive, corruptive, or coercive means. Societal interference targets our communities and non-government sectors.

There have been numerous attempts at political interference in New Zealand in recent years. Fortunately, the vast majority have had little impact on policy making or our democratic processes, but we emphasise that the potential for significant harm through political interference activity remains. This section will focus more specifically on a form of societal interference called transnational repression, where New Zealanders may be targeted because of their ethnicity, religion, politics or sexuality.

Misconceptions of foreign interference

It is important to acknowledge at the outset that these foreign states often do not consider what they are doing to be foreign interference. One reason for this is that they do not like to be called out for their behaviour. Another is that they see these activities as a continuation of their domestic policy and therefore within their sovereign authority. The NZSIS rejects any such assertions.

People living in New Zealand have the lawful right to freedom of expression and the right to participate in groups or religions without fear of reprisal. NZSIS considers it foreign interference when states seek to control, intimidate, punish or limit opportunities for people based in New Zealand. Such activity is an attack on our democratic principles and freedoms.

The most common type of societal foreign interference that New Zealanders are likely to encounter is transnational repression (TNR).

Transnational repression is activity on behalf of a foreign state intended to suppress the rights and freedoms of groups or individuals located beyond its borders. These individuals are usually seen by the state as undermining its national security or harming its interests. TNR includes a range of methods with varying levels of severity, and is usually carried out by people co-opted to act on behalf of the foreign state.

There are several foreign states that routinely engage in TNR activity in New Zealand. They falsely believe they have the authority to extend their influence to their diaspora communities. They expect their diaspora should remain politically loyal even when they reside in another country.

Who is a target of transnational repression?

Foreign states will act against individuals, groups or communities they view as ‘dissidents’. This might be any political movement or group seen as a challenge to a state’s legitimacy or power.

The NZSIS has noted TNR activity in New Zealand targeting certain religions, some ethnicities, Rainbow communities and pro-democracy movements.

Though TNR is usually directed against a foreign state’s diaspora community, it can also be directed against those with no ties to the foreign state. Often this is towards individuals or groups who are vocal critics of the foreign state or advocates for a targeted diaspora community.

Foreign states regularly flag legitimate violent extremist concerns with us. Such alerts are testament to our collaborative international relationships and contribute to our national security. Some states, however, have accused New Zealand-based groups or individuals of being extremists or even terrorists when they are not.

The NZSIS is extremely cautious about this deliberate labelling tactic, as it is used to stigmatise particular groups and to justify repressive activity against them.

What does transnational repression look like?

Foreign states typically use a co-optee to carry out TNR with either direct or implicit instructions. This often begins with the co-optee being asked to collect information about someone living in New Zealand and sharing this with the foreign state.

Activities associated with transnational repression

01 Surveillance

NZSIS is aware of co-optees undertaking both online and physical surveillance activity on behalf of foreign states here in New Zealand. Often this includes activity such as monitoring social media, photographing individuals at events or protests, or instructing other community members to collect information. The surveillance is concerning in itself, but even more so is how that information may be used by the foreign state to undertake other coercive action if the individual ever travels to that country, or against their family members living in the foreign state.

02 Harassment

Foreign states use a range of tactics to intimidate and harass so-called dissidents. This can include taking pictures of them in plain sight, online harassment or blacklisting their businesses. A foreign state may also intimidate family members who live in that country. NZSIS often receives reports of foreign officials directly approaching or using cooptees to request that certain individuals or groups be prevented from participating in public events. Sometimes donations or other financial incentives are used to influence decision-making.

03 Administrative action

NZSIS has received reports of New Zealand-based individuals having travel documentation withheld or revoked by foreign states due to their participation in political or religious activity in New Zealand. Foreign states do this with the specific intention of deterring these individuals from participating in these activities or applying a punitive cost to the activity. It is a way that these states try to exert control over individuals outside of their borders.

States have the authority to decline or revoke official documentation, but when this is done in response to lawful activity undertaken in New Zealand it undermines the rights and freedoms that New Zealand offers.

Using administrative action to control the behaviour of diaspora populations in New Zealand can have a significant impact on the individuals affected when they have family or financial interests in the foreign country.

There is also a negative impact for New Zealand if parts of our society are afraid to participate in legitimate community or political activity due to fear of reprisals from a foreign state.

04 Coerced or forced repatriation

Repressive activities can become more severe if individuals are coerced or forced to travel to a foreign country. Coerced or forced repatriation often involves a foreign state laying charges against an individual and then sending undeclared officials offshore to pressure the individual to return. This pressure can involve a range of activities. Some foreign states harass or threaten individuals or their families, or they may freeze assets held in the foreign country until the individual returns. NZSIS is aware of foreign intelligence officers who have travelled here and have likely supported coercive repatriation. It is possible these efforts were directed against people living in New Zealand.

Returning to face legitimate charges where proper extradition processes have been followed is not considered TNR.

05 Physical violence

Some foreign states are known to use violence to suppress, or in extreme cases overseas, kill high-profile individuals. Foreign states will sometimes hire organised crime syndicates to conduct this activity on their behalf. This allows them to use deniability if the activity is prevented or uncovered. However, there have been states that have used intelligence officers to eliminate perceived dissidents.

This kind of activity is far less common than other forms of TNR and rarely happens in Western countries. NZSIS assesses it is highly unlikely a foreign state has ordered the killing of New Zealand-based person. 

Foreign states, or those acting on their behalf, routinely engage with New Zealand’s communities and organisations that sit outside of central government.

Most of this engagement is harmless and provides a range of commercial and cultural benefits for New Zealand. However, NZSIS is aware of foreign interference actors seeking to manipulate certain entities in support of their objectives. Attempting to build influence is acceptable, but this activity becomes foreign interference when there is a deceptive, corruptive or coercive element involved.

Opportunities and potential relationships may not always be what they seem. This section is about raising awareness of potential risks rather than discouraging engagement.

Communities and organisations that NZSIS has observed being targeted by sophisticated foreign interference actors include local government, cultural and religious groups, academic institutions, Māori organisations and private sector businesses.

Foreign interference actors take a long-term approach to their work. Relationships and connections will usually begin in benign or seemingly legitimate ways. The dial will slowly shift over time. Skilled actors are tenacious and build pressure gradually over many years and sometimes decades. The long-term nature of these relationships can convince targets they are built on a foundation of trust or friendship while true intentions remain purposely obfuscated.

The activities described in this section can be difficult to spot, as the foreign state’s involvement will often be well concealed. It can also be difficult to truly understand the harm being caused as individual interactions will appear to have little impact, but there can be effects that mount over time unless risks are managed at an early stage.

Last year’s threat environment report warned of deceptive front organisations conducting foreign interference and that activity continues. These groups recognise the role certain organisations and communities play in shaping New Zealand’s social and political environment and seek to co-opt this influence for their own purposes.

The People’s Republic of China’s United Front Work Department (UFWD) is an example of an organisation that engages in foreign interference activities. The UFWD aims to build influence with key individuals and organisations outside of mainland China, including in New Zealand. The UFWD’s goal is to pursue the interests of the PRC government around the world. It is important to acknowledge that not all UFWD activity is foreign interference and some engagements can have benefits for New Zealand organisations. However, its activities are regularly deceptive, coercive and corruptive and come with risks for New Zealand organisations.

The use of co-optees has been an ongoing feature of foreign interference activity for many years. There are a number of individuals in New Zealand who carry out this activity in support of the objectives of foreign states. These co-optees facilitate activity, collect information, deliver messaging, and in some cases aid in the selection of targets for other intelligence activity. Their links to the foreign state and the instructions they receive are often concealed or not disclosed to their targets.

Targeting of community leaders

NZSIS analysts see foreign interference actors taking control of community organisations by co-opting or replacing leaders. This activity often involves these actors taking control by either following normal process or through some form of manipulation. Once in charge, the co-optee sidelines those deemed to be a challenge to the foreign state’s agenda.

Some foreign states have targeted their diaspora’s community groups in New Zealand in this way. This has resulted in certain community voices being excluded and the co-opted leaders becoming unrepresentative spokespeople at official events or when engaging with government officials.

Gatekeeping

New Zealand government officials are sometimes restricted from meeting or talking to certain members of a foreign state’s diaspora. NZSIS analysts have seen co-opted leaders place themselves as a go-between to control the flow of information to and from that community. 

These people will present themselves to elected representatives or government officials as a community leader but then present opinions that are favourable to a foreign state rather than necessarily reflective of the community’s views. They may also claim they can rally the community in support or opposition to a particular policy, giving a misleading impression of the community’s stance. In other cases, we have seen gatekeepers prevent information or advice from being shared with the community they claim to represent.

Exploitation of travel

Foreign interference actors have arranged travel opportunities for representatives of New Zealand organisations to build long-term influence. Often this is done to facilitate further introductions with other foreign interference actors and to build stronger relationships between them. We have seen foreign interference actors use their co-optee networks to make these travel opportunities happen while concealing the foreign interference actors’ involvement.

These trips will commonly include business deals, gift giving or photo opportunities with foreign officials and are used by foreign states to promote a perception of close ties and political support from influential New Zealanders. This can have an alienating effect on repressed communities back in New Zealand experiencing transnational repression activity from the foreign state.

Exploitation of delegations

Over the past 18 months, there has been a noticeable increase in foreign interference actors visiting New Zealand. These foreign interference actors are highly likely to have been tasked with building relationships with specific parts of New Zealand society and are willing to engage in deceptive behaviour to meet the expectations of their organisations.

Often these foreign delegations will seek an invitation from a New Zealand organisation to host them and then use the visit as a relationship building exercise. On the surface, few organisations will sense any issue but many will not know the delegation’s link to foreign interference entities. Members of these delegations will conceal these links so our communities and organisations are unable to assess the risk involved in the engagement.

NZSIS encourages strong security practices when hosting foreign delegations.

Exploitation of business opportunities

There are foreign states that seek to encourage business relationships that provide access to resources, intellectual property (IP) or critical infrastructure in New Zealand. Some of these relationships may begin as legitimate business relationships, but because of commercial or security laws in the other country, the foreign state can use the relationship for its own means. This can include as leverage to engage in economic coercion, to access information held by the company including IP, or as a way to further establish a relationship with a target. The New Zealand business may often be unaware of a foreign state’s involvement in these opportunities.

Typically, a delegation will be sent to New Zealand or there will be an invitation to visit the foreign country, where requests are made to sign agreements or other offers are presented. Deals will often be presented to the New Zealand businesses at short notice and without the opportunity to conduct due diligence or receive legal advice.

Offers of travel, visiting delegations and business opportunities are prime examples of activities that do not pose harm in isolation, but foreign state actors are prepared to play a long-term game. They will wait to apply pressure when the time is right to take advantage of personal, political and economic leverage built over time.