New Zealand's Security Threat Environment 2025

New Zealand public and private sector organisations are vulnerable to the threats described in this report when individuals within these organisations use their access to intentionally or unintentionally cause harm.

Harm from insider threat activity could include disclosure of sensitive information; loss of sensitive technology; loss or degradation of a resource or capability; compromise of assets; or reputational damage.

Insider threat activity can sometimes be impulsive and opportunistic – at other times it can be deliberate and planned. Motivations to undertake insider threat acts are complex and usually influenced by a combination of pressures and vulnerabilities. These can include disgruntlement, grievance, ambition, feeling of unmet expectations, ego, financial motivation, divided loyalties or a combination of these factors.

Often the harm caused by insider threat is unintentional, and in these cases, can be caused by complacency, naivety, or a misunderstanding of the harmful consequences of an individual’s actions.

There have been instances where insiders have engaged in behaviour that is supportive to a foreign state without receiving explicit instructions. There could be a range of motivations for this behaviour including bias, an affinity for a foreign state, or a desire to prove their worth.

Some foreign states exploit individuals who work for the New Zealand government, or who have access to government information to further their interests. They use a range of tactics to gain access to people, systems, or locations across central and local government to help the foreign state build information or influence.

Government employees routinely interact with foreign state representatives and must take care not to allow these relationships to be exploited. Foreign states approach relationships with a long-term strategic outlook, but individual employees may not be conscious of the bigger picture behind a one-off engagement.

Some foreign states will seek to use New Zealand government contacts to collect information on their targets or individuals of interest.

Roles where government employees are required to interact with both members of vulnerable communities as well as representatives of an authoritarian or repressive foreign state are at particular risk of being exploited by foreign state actors.

These states may consider using relationships with government insiders to attempt to exert influence over diaspora communities. It is possible individuals may either wittingly or unwittingly share information that could facilitate transnational repression. These employees are in a difficult position and will need more support to navigate the nuances of these communities and manage the possible involvement of foreign state actors.